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Scooping the Voters?
The Consequences oj the
Networks' Early Call
oj the
1980 Presidential Race
Michael X. Delli Carpini
Rutgers University
The election projection of the 1980 presidential contest by NBC raised much speculation
concerning its possible impact on voting in states where the polls were still open. Research on
the subject has started from different assumptions, used different data and methods, and
come to different conclusions concerning the real-world effects of such early calls. Using
district-level voting and demographic data and focusing on deviations from normal voting
patterns, this study finds the early call to have had a small but measurable impact on
presidential and congressional turnout, and a somewhat larger impact on depressing the vote
for Democratic candidates at both levels. In addition, higher income, white collar, and bet-
ter educated populations appear to have been affected to a greater extent. While the overall
impact was too small to have affected the outcome of the presidential race, at the congres-
sionallevel as many as fourteen races were won by margins smaller than the estimated impact
of the early call in those districts.
INTRODUCTION
While most of the political excitement generated by the 1980 election
centered on the surprising gains made by the Republican party, a not in-
considerable controversy arose concerning the impact, if any, of the early
prediction of a winner in the presidential race by the television networks.
Shortly after 8 o'clock Eastern Standard Time NBC announced that, ac-
cording to their analysis of exit poll data, Ronald Reagan was to be the
next president of the United States. The controversy over that early call
* This research was supported by a grant from the Research Council of Rutgers University
and by funds provided by the Eagleton Institute of Politics. I \vould like to thank C. Anthony
Broh, Samuel Kirkpatrick, Jane Whittaker" and the editors and anonymous reviewers of the
Journal of Politics for their assistance on earlier versions of this paper.
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was due to the fact that the polls in many states were still open at the
time, and in some of the western states would remain open for several
hours.
The question, then, was: did the early call affect voting patterns in
these states? The debate over the real and potential effects of the early
call took place at several levels: disgruntled congressional losers blamed
their losses, directly and indirectly, on the prognostication; legislators in-
troduced bills to regulate either poll closing times or the timing of net-
work election predictions; a congressional task force report was released;
and journalists and editorialists gave their thoughts on the possible impact
of the call.
In addition to this general furor, several researchers have also at-
tempted systematically to uncover the possible effects of such early calls
(Wolfinger and Linquiti, 1981; Epstein and Strom, 1981; J~ckson, 1983;
Tannenbaum and Kostrich, 1983; Dubois, 1983). These studies, starting
from different theoretical assumptions and using different data and
methods, have come to quite different conclusions, ranging from no effect
(Epstein and Strom) to a potential decline of 6 to 12 percent (Jackson).
In this paper we add yet another voice to the debate by analyzing the
issue from a somewhat different and, we hope, more conclusive perspec-
tive. In order to do this we first layout the basic issues involved, the
substantive and methodological differences among the various ap-
proaches to studying the impact, and a justification for the approach
taken in this analysis. Next the data and methods to be used are discussed
in more detail. Third, the results of the analysis are presented, and fi-
nally their significance and implications are considered.
TURNOUT, VOTE CHOICE, AND THE EARLY CALL
There are four key issues in early call controversies: first, is turnout
depressed in those areas where the polls were still open? second, are par-
ticular types of voters more or less likely to be affected by the call? third,
are particular types of candidates more or less likely to suffer from the
early call? and, most critical, are the outcomes of particular races af-
fected? As with most important and complex issues, there are good
theoretical reasons to expect all or none of these to occur.
The logic of depressed turnout is, of course, that once the presidential
race has been decided, some percentage of those who have not yet voted
and who still have an opportunity to do so may decide not to vote. As
Wolfinger and Linquiti put it:
there is no escaping the fact that it takes the excitement of a presidential race to get many peo-
ple to the polls. Therefore it seems reasonable to expect that some people who otherwise
would have gone to the polls, and voted for non-presidential candidates, choose instead to
forego voting when the top draw is no longer in doubt. (1981, p. 56)
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This argument, while having a certain intuitive appeal, is not universally
accepted however. Epstein and Strom, for example, argue that "the
decision to vote-on the West Coast or anywhere else-is the result of a
complicated combination of factors, none of which is related to informa-
tion received on election day" (p. 486).
The early call need not affect all voters who have yet to vote (but who
still have a chance), nor need it affect them all in the same way. Wolf-
inger and Linquiti, for instance, examine the effect of the early calion in-
dividuals with different education levels and different occupations; they
assume that socioeconomic status, since it affects both turnout and media
use, might interact with the early call. Jackson, on the other hand, ex-
amines the interaction between the early call and partisanship, assuming
that one's partisan leanings might mute or accentuate any effect.
While a drop in overall turnout is the most obvious impact to expect
from an early call, it is also possible that specific vote choices might also
be affected. Tannenbaum· and Kostrich suggest that a "bandwagon ef-
fect" and an "underdog effect" are theoretically plausible expectations in
such situations (1983, pp. 27-28).
The final possible effect concerns the actual outcomes of elections. As
Tannenbaum and Kostrich correctly point out, it is implausible to suggest
that the early call could have affected the outcome of the 1980 presiden-
tial race. It is possible, however, that some combination of lowered turn-
out, bandwagon, or underdog effects for all or specific segments of the in-
volved population could have helped to determine the outcomes of local
races, many of which were decided by extremely small margins.
The differences in expectations are matched by parallel differences in
findings. This fact leads one set of scholars, upon reviewing the
literature, to conclude that the evidence is "mixed and the jury, ourselves
among them, has still to issue a verdict" (Tannenbaum and Kostrich,
1983, p. 83). The problem in determining where the truth lies is con-
founded by differences in methodology and data. Wolfinger and Lin-
quiti look at the early call of 1972, use census survey data, and compare
1972 differences in turnout between California and the other states (ex-
cluding four) to 1974 differences between the same groupings. Epstein
and Strom look at the 1964, 1972, and the 1980 early calls, use state-level
voting statistics, and compare the five westernmost states to thirty-five
nonwestern and nonsouthern states over a period of as much as twenty
years. Jackson uses the 1980 National Election Study in conj,unction with
a follow-up telephone survey. Tannenbaum and Kostrich review allTIost
all of the research on the topic, reanalyzing much of it using a more
multivariate design. Finally, Dubois reanalyzes Epstein and Strom's
data, eliminating absentee ballots (which would have been mailed I)ri()r
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to the early call) and using the number of registered voters rather than the
number of potential voters as the base.
All of the authors offer reasonable justifications for their particular ap-
proaches, and all add a good deal to our understanding of the complex-
ities of the relationships involved. All however have certain weaknesses
which contribute to the lack of consensus on the issue. Several of these
shortcomings are idiosyncratic to specific studies. While a critique of
each piece of research is beyond the scope of this article, the problems
revolve centrally around the choice of a baseline against which to
evaluate the effects of early calls, the choice of which of the three early
call elections (1964, 1972, or 1980) to study, and the level and unit of
analysis employed (see Tannenbaum and Kostrich, 1983, for a detailed
critique of extant research in this area).
In addition to such study-specific points, there are also two points
which apply to almost all of the research on early calls. First, with the
exception of Jackson's study, all use rather crude breakdowns concerning
where the effects might occur. While the West Coast states are clearly
the most likely to be affected, any state where the polls were still open
after the NBC announcement should be considered. By not only ex-
cluding many such states from the postcall group, but also including them
in the precall group, researchers may have confounded their results to
some extent. Second, none of the studies examines the effects of early
calls for all four of the theorized impacts (turnout, vote choice, the impact
on specific segments of the population, and the impact on other races).
Wolfinger and Linquiti examine the interaction of the early call with
education and occupation, and Jackson tests for the effects of partisan-
ship, but no one tests for the impact on either the direction of the vote
choice or on local election results; they focus almost exclusively on turnout
instead (Tannenbaum and Kostrich do discuss these issues, but do not pre-
sent data on them).
The research design used here is a somewhat more complex but, we
feel, more accurate approach to the problem. First, it focuses on 1980 as
the best example of an early call with the potential to affect voting
behavior, since it was the earliest call and the only one in which the race
was perceived to be close as the polls opened. 1 Second, it uses congres-
sional districts as the unit of analysis, since they are not as aggregated as
states or regions and yet they are still not dependent on the memories and
honesty of individual survey respondents. Third, the point of com-
1 While the expected closeness of the 1980 race makes it a better choice for studying the ef-
fects of an early call, the early concession by Carter is problematic. Our analysis cannot
distinguish between the two; consequently, it is possible that some of the impact reported here
is the result of that concession. In either case, however, the central issue remains whether the
voter has received a message that the election has been decided.
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parison is an estimate of normal voting patterns which is based upon an
average vote over several elections rather than a comparison to a single
election. 2 Fourth, this analysis includes the entire country rather than
selected states or regions, making no a priori assumptions as to which of
the postcall districts would necessarily be affected. Fifth, actual poll
closing times are used to distinguish precall from postcall districts. This
not only allows for a more accurate design, but it helps to eliminate
regional effects that might confuse interpretations of findings, since many
southern, midwestern, and even some eastern states had polls that re-
mained open for some time after the call was made (see appendix A). 3
Sixth, this design allows one to examine not only the effects on presiden-
tial turnout, but also on congressional turnout, specific vote choice at the
presidential and at the congressional level, and the impact of a selected set
of demographic characteristics. Finally, it includes an estimate of the
possible impact of the early calIon the outcomes of the individual con-
gressional ra~es in 1980.
2. The concept of a normal vote is most often applied to presidential voting patterns. In
the following analysis we apply it to congressional voting as well. While nothing inherent in
the methodology or the theory prevents this kind of analysis, the specific dynamics of congres-
sional elections might be such as to make the idea of a normal vote unrealistic. For several
reasons we feel such analysis is justified however. First, the major source of volatility in con-
gressional turnout and vote choice-the difference between off-year and presidential election
patterns - is eliminated by the fact that only presidential election years are included in th'e
normal vote estimation. The long-term pattern of voting in presidential and congressional
elections during presidential election years is remarkably similar (Flanigan and Zingale, 1983,
p. 12). Second, the actual amount of surge and decline in congressional elections during the
period examined was almost identical to that found for presidential voting (less than 0.2 per-
cent difference over the four elections examined), suggesting a similar utility for the normal
vote analysis. Third, the standard deviations in the congressional normal vote analysis for
the four election years are no larger than those for the presidential analysis, indicating that the
individual district scores are no more volatile in the congressional case. Finally, idiosyncratic
factors such as personality, incumbency, and the effects of other races are no more prevalent
in congressional than in presidential races, and no more prevalent in districts where the polls
were still open after the early call than in districts where they had closed.
3 This is an important consideration since, as pointed out both by Epstein and Strom and
by Dubois, different long-term trends in voting behavior can lead to a misinterpretation of
differences found in 1980. As a check on this we compared the patterns of deviations from
the normal vote from 1968 to 1976 for the precall and the postcall districts. In every measure
of change used in this analysis overall patterns were quite similar for both groups over time.
In addition, we compared only the West Coast states to the precall and the other postcall
districts. While the West Coast districts did show a slightly different pattern of deviation
from their normal votes, the differences are not consistently in a direction that would bias the
results in a way that would increase the apparent effect of the call, and are never more than 1
percent different than the precall districts. This increases our confidence that the differences
found in 1980 are not due to regional differences.
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The data used for examining the impact of the early call are aggregate
voting and demographic statistics. The unit of analysis is the congres-
sional district. Congressional districts were chosen for several reasons.
First, since districts are smaller and more numerous than states, analyzing
them might uncover effects lost in the more aggregated political unit. Sec-
ond, demographic data are readily available at the district level, and
because districts show much greater variance on these statistics than do
states, they are more useful for identifying interrelationships. Finally,
since districts are the political units that elect members of Congress, they
allow the impact of the early calIon specific electoral outcomes to be
tested.
. The specific district-level statistics collected consist of the following:
vote for the Democratic, Republican, and "Other" presidential can-
didates; vote for the Democratic, Republican, and "Other" congressional
candidates; and, the number of registered voters. 4 The data were col-
lected for the elections of 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980. Since congres~
sional districts in several states had been redistricted during this period,
there was a potential problem of lack of comparability within districts
over time- a key part of the analysis to follow. Fortunately, two sources
exist which recalculate the votes of past elections along the new district
lines. 5
In addition to the voting statistics, data on demographic characteristics
of each district were also collected (Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, 1980,
1982). The specific categories, which are listed in appendix B, generally
center around income, occupational, and educational distributions.
Finally, the exact time at which the polls closed in each of the 435 districts
was included (obtained from the New York Times, 4 November).
4 Registered voters are used rather than eligible voters because, as Dubois correctly points
out, this method eliminates a source of variance that could not be affected by the early call
and so increases our confidence that the changes found can be attributed to that call. That is,
since the decision to register was made prior to the early call, since different regions have
higher or lower rates of registration, and since nonregistered voters cannot vote regardless of
whether they heard the early call, including nonregistered voters in the analysis adds nothing
and could confound the decision not to register with the decision not to vote. Unfortunately,
the number of registered voters is available by state, but not by district. We therefore use
state averages for the districts in each state. This method is admittedly not as sensitive as that
of Dubois, but it is better than using the number of eligible voters and is, simply put, the best
we can do for a study that is national in scope.
S Congressional Quarterly provides a recalculation of the congressional vote in districts in
Congressional Districts in the Seventies. The Almanac of American Politics provides a
similar recalculation for the presidential vote at the district level, as well as the more recent
congressional changes.
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The basic approach taken in our analysis is to compare the voting
behavior of the districts where the polls were still open after the NBC
prediction not only with the districts where the polls were closed but also
with the "normal vote" of each district. That is, we compare how the
postcall districts in 1980 differ from their normal pattern of voting, com-
pare how the precall districts differ from their normal patterns, and then
compare these differences to each other.
In order to perform this kind of analysis, measures of a normal vote and
of change in the vote are needed. We have chosen an adaptation of the
approach developed by Flanigan and Zingale (1974). This method,
which is a modification of analysis of variance, defines the normal vote as
the mean vote for each unit of analysis over the whole set of elections
under consideration. Surge (or decline) is defined as movement away
from this normal vote in a particular election and is operationalized for
each district as the vote in a particular election minus the district's normal
vote. The overall amount of surge or decline is measured by the dif-
ference between the grand mean (the average vote for all districts in all
election years) and the election mean (the average vote in a particular
election).6
The Flanigan and Zingale model is used to estimate the eight particular
types of surge and decline used in this analysis. Since, as demonstrated
by Flanigan and Zingale, basing one's estimate of change on the vote
totals for one party can result in a different pattern than estimates based
on the other party's vote share, we estimate change in the vote for
Democratic, Republican, and "Other" candidates for president. We
repeat this for voting at the congressional level.
6 Normal vote analysis has moved in several different directions since Converse first
developed the concept (1966). While a review of the various approaches is beyond the scope
of this paper, a few comments are in order. First, while Converse's analysis focuses centrally
on the development of normal vote analysis in survey research, he also saw its utility in ag-
gregate research. This aggregate approach is developed by Flanigan and Zingale and is
employed in this article. Second, because Converse focuses on individual-level data, his
operationalization allows for a consideration of the propensity of various groups (most
notably individuals with different levels and directions of partisan attachments) to be in-
fluenced by short-term forces in an election. The Flanigan and Zingale approach is much
more tied to the actual behavior of the units of analysis under consideration. In short, Con-
verse's model determines the normal vote based on prior expectations of the behavior of cer-
tain types of individuals, while Flanigan and Zingale's model does so based upon the prior
(and subsequent) behavior of more aggregated units. Both, however, are based upon a com-
mon and relatively simple logic: the separation of long-term patterns of voting behavior from
short-term deviations in that pattern, both for the nation as a whole and for distinct parts of
that whole. While this analysis depends heavily on Flanigan and Zingale's model, it is in part
an adaption of it. We examine not only the normal partisan vote, but also the normal turn-
out rates. For comparison, as well as a more in-depth discussion of the method, see Flanigan
and Zingale, 1974.
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The measures of surge and decline are used in the comparisons of
precall and postcall districts. Since these estimates are based upon the
normal voting patterns within each district, a relative difference between
the two groups would suggest an impact attributable to the early call. In
addition, we can compare the behavior of certain types of districts (based
on the demographic data) to see if the impact was greater for particular
groups in the population.
FINDINGS
The results of the analyses concerning overall turnout levels are
presented in table 1. A positive number indicates a surge in turnout
while a negative number indicates a decline, relative to the normal voting
patterns in each district. As can be seen, turnout was down in 1980 for
TABLE 1
SURGE AND DECLINE IN TURNOUT RATES FOR THE
1980 PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RACES
PRESIDENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL
RACE RACES
Total Districts: -2.70/0 (.3) -3.80/0 (.6)
(N = 435)
·Precall Districts: -2.10/0 (.4) -3.40/0 (.4)
(N = 245)
Postcall Districts: -3.20/0 (.4) - 4.40/0 (.6)
(N = 190)
Difference: -1.10/0* -1.00/0*
Note: Percentages are the mean amount of surge or decline in the respective groupings.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
* p :5 .05.
the country as a whole, with the drop slightly more noticeable in the
postcall districts (about 1.1 percent more decline). Turnout in congres-
sional voting shows a similar pattern, with decline in the postcall districts
1.0 percent greater than in the precall districts. Even if we were to at-
tribute all of this difference to the election night projections (something
which is by nQ means obvious), it would seem that while the earl)1 call did
have an impact on turnout, that impact was small.
While overall turnout showed a relatively small relationship with the
early call, the patterns concerning the specific candidates and party' af-
fected are somewhat more suggestive. Table 2 presents the relati\'e surge
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TABLE 2
SURGE AND DECLINE IN DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN, AND "OTHER"
VOTE IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL RACE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN "OTHER"
CANDIDATE CANDIDATE CANDIDATES
Total Districts: -2.00/0 (.3) -1.5% (.2) +1.0% (.2)
(N = 435)
Precall Districts: - .70/0 (.4) -1.50/0 (.3) + .1 0/0 (.3)
(N = 245)
Postcall Districts: -3.80/0 (.3) -1.50/0 (.~) +2.1% (.3)
(N = 190)
Difference -3.1 % * 00/0 +2.00/0·
Note: Percentages are the mean amount of surge or decline in the respective groupings.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
* p :s .05.
and decline in the vote for Carter, Reagan, and Anderson. 7 Voting for
the Republican candidate was completely unaffected by the early call,
with precall and postcall districts varying from their normal patterns in
exactly the same amount and direction. The Democratic vote, however,
declined 3.1 percent more in the postcall districts than in the precall
districts. Because these figures are calculated on the normal voting pat-
terns of each district, the differences are not due to underlying partisan
leanings in·the various d.istricts. It is, of course, still possible that Carter's
appeal just happened to be less in the 190 districts in which polls were still
open after the projection of results, but the pattern is at least consistent
with the argument that the early call led some people not to vote for a
candidate who had already lost.
Table 2 also reveals a difference in voting for third party candidates,
with a 2 percent surge in the postcall districts. Once again, this dif-
ference could simply be the result of stronger support for Anderson in
those districts, but the findings leave open the possibility that some voters,
seeing that Carter had lost, felt free to vote for the third party candidate. 8
7 While overall voting dropped by 1.1 percent, the shift in party vote was in some cases
greater. This is possible because table 2 and table 3 capture deviations in the normal vote
which take into account both relative shifts and absolute changes in party vote. That is, the
change is the result both of a drop in Democratic vote and an overall drop in rate. The drop
of 3.1 percent Democratic vote, the increase of 2.0 percent "Other Vote," and the lack of
change in Republican voting leads to a net change of -1.1 percent. This imbalance is ac-
counted for by the absolute drop in turnout of 1.1 percent noted in table 1.
8 This is consistent with a notion of not wanting to waste a vote, since Anderson was
reported to be fighting to reach the 5 percent mark that would enable him to get federal
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When we turn to voting in the congressional elections, slightly larger
differences between the precall and the postcall districts are seen (table
3). Voting for Democratic candidates was, of course, down nationally in
1980, but once again the relative drop was greater in the districts where
the polls were still open after the NBC call than in those where they had
closed, with a difference of 2.9 percent. In addition, however, voting for
Republican candidates declined in the precall districts while it was up
slightly in the postcall districts, with a net advantage of 1.8 percent for
the Republican party. When this is combined with the differences in
Democratic voting there is a total swing of 4.7 percent in favor of the
Republicans in the postcall districts: a swing which could be attributed to
the early call. 9
What does a rise in voting Republican above both normal voting pat-
terns within each district and the pattern found in the precall districts
suggest about the individual voter's decision-making calculus? While
such. speculation is risky, these findings suggest something of a band-
wagon effect, in which news of the surprising and overwhelming
Reagan/Republican victory led to small numbers of voters in those
districts in which the polls were still open deciding to be part of this new
"mandate." Results using individual-level data demonstrate overreport-
ing of having voted for the candidate who won, lending support to this
kind of interpretation. We can not explain, however, why this effect
should occur at the congressional level but not at the presidential level .
.Possibly the fact that the presidential race was technically over, while
the congressional races were yet to be decided was a factor, but this is im-
possible to confirm at the level of analysis presented here.
A final observation on congressional voting concerns third party can-
didates. Voting for such candidates showed a slight effect, with a dif-
ference of 0.3 percent in favor of third party candidates in the postcall
matching funds. In addition, those people who preferred Anderson, but were planning to
vote for Carter or Reagan because of the chance that the election might be determined by the
third party vote no longer needed to hold back. However, such speculation concerning in-
dividual behavior and motivations can not be conclusively demonstrated from the aggregate
data presented in this analysis. We have attempted to avoid this fallacy to a great extent by
specifying the parameters of the models used in as much detail as possible, by presenting find-
ings at the aggregate level, and by inferring individual causes of such findings with caution
and healthy skepticism. Where we do consider such individual behavior it is to demonstrate
that one can suggest plausible scenarios at that level which are consistent with the data
presented; it is not to argue that such scenarios have been authenticated.
9 In this analysis we distinguish candidates only by their party label. Other
characteristics, such as incumbency, might also affect the way districts reacted to the early
call. While such characteristics would be interesting to examine, they fall beyond the scope
of this paper. Not examining them should not bias the results discussed here however, since
such candidates and such effects are evenly distributed between pre- and postcall districts.
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TABLE 3
SURGE AND DECLINE IN DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN, AND "OTHER~'
VOTE IN THE 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RACES
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN "OTHER"
CANDIDATES CANDIDATES CANDIDATES
Total Districts: - 2.1 0/0 ( .7) 00/0 ( .6) + .20/0 (.5)
(N = 422)
Precall Districts: - .80/0 (1.1) - .70/0 ( .6) -.10/0 (.1)
(N = 241)
Postcall Districts: -3.70/0 ( .6) +1.10/0 (1.7) + .20/0 (.6)
(N = 181)
Difference -2.90/0 * +1.80/0* + .30/0
Note: Percentages are the mean amount of surge or decline in respective groupings.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
* p s .05.
districts - a finding consistent with voting at the presidential level. The
much smaller effect at the congressional level can be attributed to the
absence of a single, visible third party equivalent to Anderson.
To this point we have been comparing all of the precall districts to all of
the postcall districts, making no further distinctions. If the early call was
responsible for the differences found, then we would expect the impact to
be more pronounced in those districts where the polls were open latest.
We would not, however,expect the effects to be limited solely to the West
Coast. Were the effects so limited, the findings discussed above could be
attributed to Reagan's popularity in his home region rather than to the
early call. In order to test for this possibility, tables 1-3 were redone, this
time to distinguish between non-West postcall districts and West Coast
districts (California, Washington, and Oregon). The results, presented
in appendix C, tables 1-3, clearly demonstrate that while the West Coast
shows the strongest effects (as would be expected given that their polls
were open latest), the effects are not at all limited to that region.
In addition to this categorical analysis, simple regression equations
were run, with how long the polls were open after the call as the indepen-
dent variable and the various surge measures as the dependent
variables. 10 The unstandardized regression coefficients, which show the
percentage change in the amount of surge (or decline) for each additional
10 For this part of the analysis, all polls closing either at the time of or prior to the NBC call
were recorded as 8 PM, so that impact refers to the number of hours the polls were open after
that time.
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hour the polls remained open, are presented in table 4C (appendix C). As
can be readily seen, the results are consistent with the conclusions drawn
from both pre/post comparisons. In addition, the regression analyses
show that how long the polls were open after the call was made is useful in
distinguishing the amount of decline and surge which took place. This
adds further credence to the argument that the early call did, in fact,
have an impact. II
Having the opportunity to refrain from voting because the outcome has
already been announced does not necessarily mean that an individual will
take advantage of that opportunity. Put in the aggregate, it is possible
that certain types of districts were more or less affected by the early call.
In particular, we were interested in how those characteristics found by
other studies to relate to levels of political interest, information, and in-
volvement, and to patterns of media use, would affect levels of surge and
decline in the postcall districts. In order to test for this the following
method was employed. A measure of socioeconomic status (SES) com-
bining standardized measures of education, income, and occupational
levels in each district was developed (see appendix B). In addition,
measures for the length of time the polls were open after the early call and
for the interaction between SES and this time variable (SES x Number of
minutes the polls remained open after 8 PM) were developed. Multiple
regression equations were then run for all 435 districts, with SES, time,
and the interaction term as the independent variables and the eight
measures of surge and decline as the dependent variables. Controls for
age, race, and the closeness of the presidential and congressional races
were also introduced to prevent the confounding of SES effects with
related political and social variables and to allow more confident transla-
tion of the results to the individual level (Langbein and Lichtman, 1977).
The interaction terms which result from these equations are measures
of the combined effects of SES and the early call. These effects are
presented in table 4. The numbers are the percent increase in the vote for
each standard deviation increase in the interaction of SES and the early
call. A negative sign indicates that as SES and the length of time the polls
11 The one finding in the regression analysis which is not consistent with the findings of the
pre/post comparisons concerns the relationship between poll closing time and voting for
Republican congressional candidates. Voting for Republicans was up slightly in the postcall
districts, especially relative to the precall districts. In the regression analysis, however, there
is evidence which points to a possible depressing effect of the early call on Republican congres-
sional voting. One possible explanation is that while voting for Republican candidates was
up generally in these districts, the election prediction acted to depress the amount of surge
which occurred, leading to a negative slope in the regression line. A second or additional
possibility is that some type of interaction was taking place, with different districts behaving
in quite different ways.
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were open after the call increases, voting (either turnout or a particular
choice) decreases, while a positive sign indicates the reverse. If one is
willing to accept that the interaction term is a valid measure of the effect
of the early calion the relationship between SES and voting then it is clear
that districts with different levels of SES did react differently to the early
call. In addition, while the relationships are not equally strong, all are
significant; taken as a whole they show a distinguishable pattern: the bet-
ter off, better educated, white collar populations show relative declines in
six of the eight relationships presented.
TABLE 4
THE INTERACTION EFFECTS OF SES AND THE EARLY CALL
ON VOTING IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
PREsIDENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL
RACE RACES
Turnout -.55% (.21) -.49% (.26)
Democratic -.21% (.16) - .930/0 (.32)
Vote
Republican -.23% (.12) + .18 % (.16)
Vote
"Other" - .11 % (.14) + .25 % (.27)
Vote
Note: Percentages are the unstandardized regression coefficients for the interaction term of
SES x length of time the polls were open past the early call. They represent the percent in-
crease or decrease in the vote for each standard deviation in the interaction term. The figures
in parentheses are standard errors.
This pattern is consistent with the one found by Wolfinger and Linquiti
in the 1972 election. They explain the initially surprising result by point-
ing out that "before people can be deterred from voting by knowing that
the networks have called a winner, they must first hear the news. Who is
more likely to hear political news than the best educated?" (p. 59). We
A potentially interesting test of whether or not the general patterns uncovered in these
regressions are actually the result of the early call is to run the same regressions using only the
precall districts. One would expect no such pattern of decline over time between 6 and 8 PM.
Unfortunately such a test cannot be accurately performed because ten of the twelve states
which closed prior to 8 PM are southern states. As Epstein and Strom demonstrate, these
states have long-term voting ·patterns that, when compared to northeastern states, show
higher turnout and declining Democratic support. In our analysis this would result in a pat-
tern suggesting that the differences among the poll closing times in the precall districts were
having an impact - in fact this is a regional effect. This effect is eliminated in the precalll
postcall analysis however (see note 3).
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concur with this post hoc theorizing and extend it to include not only the
most educated but the white collar, higher income citizen as well. In ad-
dition, one might speculate that since members of this segment of the
population are most likely to see their votes in "instrumental" terms (i.e.,
in terms of policy preferences and electoral outcomes), it is also this seg-
ment of the population which might be most likely to see a vote for a can-
didate who has already lost or already won as somewhat noninstrumen-
tal.
The two exceptions to this pattern of greater decline for the higher SES
districts are in voting for Republican and for "Other" congressional can-
didates. In both cases the exact opposite relationship is found: the early
call increases voting for such candidates among higher SES districts.
While we are at a loss to explain the voting for third party candidates, a
possible explanation for the Republican vote can be based on the discus-
sion of the overall patterns found for congressional voting. We suggested
that the increase in voting for Republican congressional candidates might
have been the result of a bandwagon effect, but we were surprised to find
no such effect at the presidential level. Distinguishing between the
already settled presidential race and the still undecided congressional
races, and then acting on that distinction, requires a relatively
sophisticated calculation. The results presented in .table 4 provide
evidence that those individuals who made such a distinction were in fact
from a segment of the population capable and likely to do so. An even
more elaborate explanation might be that Republican activists (who come
disproportipnately from the higher SES ranks), aware of the potential ef-
fects of an early calion the local races (and perhaps noting actual drops in
turnout at the polls), worked to get supporters out in a last minute rush,
while the Democrats, less organized as a rule and demoralized by the
early call, were not able or less able to do so. Again, this is highly
speculative; we know of no evidence to demonstrate that this occurred in
such districts, though reports of party organizations using early returns to
mobilize voters are fairly common.
The impact of the early calion voting in the presidential election was
clearly too small to have affected the outcome in even one state, let alone
the race overall. On the congressional level, however, it is theoretically
possible that a race could have been close enough to be affected by this
kind of "disturbance." Our final analysis is an attempt to determine any
indication of whether this is empirically possible. In order to do this one
could simply see if any races were closer than the average net amount of
surge and decline in congressional voting: this analysis reveals that four-
teen races were decided by an amount smaller than the net Republican
advantage of 4.7 percent established in table 3. This approach ignores
the differences in the impact of the early call among districts of varying
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demographic characteristics and is, therefore, a relatively crude estima-
tion procedure. In addition, therefore, we also used the basic method of
estimating the effects of SES to develop a more sensitive measure of im-
pact. First, a series of demographic and political variables, along with
their interaction with poll closing times, were included in a regression
equation. 12 Second, using surge in the vote for Democratic congressional
candidates and surge in the vote for Republican congressional candidates
as the separate dependent variables, the equation was run for all 435
districts. Third, the resulting unstandardized regression coefficients for
the interaction terms were used to estimate the amount of surge and
decline in the postcall districts which could be attributed to the early call.
Fourth, the surge and/or decline in congressional voting for Republican
and Democratic candidates were combined to obtain a measure of the net
impact of the early call; and finally, this net impact was compared to the
actual margin of victory in the various postcall congressional races to see
if any districts had races that were decided by a smaller margin than the
estimated impact of the early call.
The average net impact which results from this estimation procedure is
a 4.9 percent advantage for the Republican candidates, with a standard
error of only 0.51 percent. This is strikingly similar to the 4.7 percent
Republican advantage derived from the procedure used earlier in this
paper and is, therefore, an encouraging sign that the new estimates are
not unrealistic (and that both estimates are relatively valid and reliable).
The value of this new estimate, of course, is that it is more finely tuned to
specific types of districts. When we compare these estimated impacts to
the actual margins of victory, we find that of the 190 postcall races, only
five were won by a smaller impact than the estimated effect of the early
call in that district. Of these five districts, four are cases in which
Republicans won. When we include the standard error into our com-
parison we find that the total number of districts affected ranges from five
to seven, with from four to six races won by the Republicans and from
zero to three won by the Democrats. We do not claim in this analysis to
have identified the races which were in fact affected: only that it is possi-
ble, using a set of realistic assumptions, to argue that some small percent-
age of the races could have been affected, and that such an effect appears
to have been to the Republicans~net advantage. 13
12 For the specific variables used, see appendix B. Several interaction terms are used here
in a rather inductive approach since the goal of this part of the analysis is to replicate as much
of the variance in surge and decline in the postcall districts as possible.
13 The specific districts involved were examined individually, and the argument of an ef-
fect by the early call is plausible in all of them.
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In this paper we have tried to shed new light on the debate concerning
the early call of the 1980 presidential election by examining the patterns
of voting in a different and more illuminating way. The results suggest
the following. First, turnout for both the presidential and congressional
races was down in the affected districts, but by an amount smaller than
that found by Jackson. Our findings on turnout are more in line with
those found by Wolfinger and Linquiti in 1972 and Dubois in 1980,
especially when only the West Coast is considered. Second, the choice of
whom to vote for appears to have been affected to a somewhat greater ex-
tent, with voting for the Democratic candidates for Congress and the
presidency depressed, voting for third party candidates increased, and
voting for Republican candidates giving mixed indications leaning toward
a type of bandwagon effect. Third, consistent with the argument that
the early call was responsible for these deviations from past behavior, the
impact was greater the later the polls were open, but was found even in
non-West Coast districts. Fourth, consistent with Wolfinger and Lin-
quiti's research (and contrary to that of Tannenbaum and Kostrich) the
greatest impacts were found in those districts whose residents were most
likely to follow election results: the more educated, higher income, white
collar population. Fifth, it is arguable that the impact of the early call
was large enough in some postcall districts to have affected the outcomes
of from five to fourteen of the congressional races. Finally, the general
pattern of disadvantage for the Democrats holds true for these individual
races, in which most were cases of Republicans winning by margins
smaller than the estimated impact of the early call.
The results of this analysis are significant at two levels. First, if we are
correct, then it would seem that the 1980 pronouncement by NBC did
have a small but measurable impact on the results of the elections, and
that the consequences of the call go beyond the presidential contest.
Second - and in some ways more interesting from an academic stand-
point - the results indicate that the media can indeed affect political
behavior differentially, when exposure is different. A major problem in
media research is finding real-world examples of the media reaching some
people but not others. It is, as a rule, such a pervasive element of our
society that it is difficult to find a truly unaffected population. The 1980
election provided a natural experiment for testing effects, and the results
of our analysis suggest that the impact of the media on political behavior
is real, identifiable, and complex.
It is not our intention to argue that the results of this analysis lead to the
conclusion that networks should be limited in their freedom to make such
early predictions, nor to advocate policies such as uniform poll closing
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times. Since such speculation is inevitable, however, three caveats to this
kind of a reaction should be noted. First, because we are working with
such small differences in numbers, many other things could be affecting
the patterns we have uncovered. It is possible, especially concerning the
patterns of vote choice, that the Republicans were simply unusually at-
tractive in those districts that coincidentally closed their polls at a later
hour. Perhaps Carter's early concession, while admittedly in part the
result of the early call, was a critical magnifier of the impact. It may be
that had we chosen a different method of estimation, a somewhat dif-
ferent pattern of impacts would have resulted. Finally, perhaps cir-
cumstances unique to the 1980 election make it unlikely that an early call
in another year would have the same results. We suspect that all of these
things are important in addition to the early call; we are, therefore, more
confident in the general directions of the findings than in the specific
numbers presented.
Second, even if one accepts at face value these results, it does not
automatically follow that something must be done. The decision to vote
is the result of a myriad of factors all subject to change in a changing en-
vironment. Election and registration laws, education levels, the advent
of mass newspapers and the electronic media, changing party structures
and campaign strategies, the individual personalities and issues all affect
who will vote and for whom: that is simply the nature of voting in a com-
plex society. Our analysis suggests that the networks' early predictions
should be added to the list of environmental factors - not that this should
necessarily be singled out.
Finally, even if one does conclude that the network predictions are
somehow different from other environmental factors and should be con-
trolled for the sake of democratic norms and principles, a host of equally
lofty norms and principles concerning freedom of speech and the press re-
main to complicate the debate - a debate that has no clearly democratic
solution.
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ApPENDIX A
Poll Closing Times: All times are Eastern Standard Time. Where a
range of times is shown, individual districts were determined by a map in-
dicating time zone changes. When this did not account for the range, the
average closing time was used.
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
6-8 PM
11 PM-2 AM
9PM
8:30 PM
11 PM
9PM
8PM
8PM
7-8 PM
7PM
11 PM
10-11 PM
8PM
6-7 PM
10 PM
9-10 PM
6-7 PM
9PM
8-9 PM
8PM
8PM
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
10 PM
9PM
10 PM
6-8 PM
8PM
9PM
9PM
7:30-8:30 PM
8-9 PM
7:30 PM
8PM
11 PM
8PM
9PM
7PM
8-9 PM
8PM
8-9 PM
10 PM
7PM
7PM
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11 PM
7:30 PM
9PM
9PM
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Precall Districts: 245
Postcall Districts: 190
8-9 PM
9PM
7PM
8PM
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
APPENDIX B
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES USED FOR ESTIMATING
THE IMPACT OF THE EARLY CALL
1. i Percent earning $15,000 or more. •
2. Median education level. •
3. Percent white collar. •
4. Median age.
5. Percent black.
6. Closeness of the presidential vote.
7. Closeness of the congressional vote.
8. Number of minutes the polls re-
mained open after eight PM.
• Standardized and combined into a single measure of SESe
ApPENDIX C
SURGE AND DECLINE COMPARISONS DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN
WEST COAST AND NON-WEST COAST POSTCALL DISTRICTS
TABLE lC
SURGE AND DECLINE IN TURNOUT RATES FOR THE
1980 PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL RACES
PRESIDENTIAL
RACE
CONGRESSIONAL
RACES
Precall Districts:
(N = 245)
-2.1 % (.4) -3.40/0 (.4)
Postcall Districts:
Without West Coast
(N = 136)
- 2.9 % (.6) - 3.8 % (.6)
West Coast Districts: G - 4.2 % (.6) - 5.6 % (.9)
Note: Percentages are mean amount of surge or decline in the respective groupings. Fig-
ures in p'arentheses are standard errors.
o California, Oregon, and Washington.
SCOOPING THE VOTERS?
TABLE 2C
SURGE AND DECLINE IN DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN, AND "OTHER"
VOTE IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL RACE
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Precall Districts:
(N = 245)
Postcall Districts:
Without West Coast
(N = 136)
West Coast Districts: a
(N = 54)
DEMOCRATIC
CANDIDATE
- .70/0 (.4)
-2.90/0 (.4)
-6.20/0 (.3)
REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATE
-1.5% (.3)
-1.40/0 (.4)
-1.8 % (.4)
UOTHERU
CANDIDATES
+ .1 % (.3)
+ 1.5 % (.3)
+3.70/0 (.3)
Note: Percentages are mean amount of surge or decline in the respective groupings. Fig-
ures in parentheses are standard errors.
CI California, Oregon, and Washington.
TABLE 3C
SURGE AND DECLINE IN DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLICAN, AND "OTHER"
VOTE IN THE 1980 CONGRESSIONAL RACES
DEMOCRATIC
CANDIDATES
REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATES
UOTHER"
CANDIDATES
Precall Districts:
(N = 241)
Postcall Districts:
Without West Coast
(N = 128)
West Coast Districts: a
- .90/0 (.9) - .70/0 (.6) -.1 % ( .2)
-3.20/0 (.7) +2.10/0 (2.3) +1.40/0 (2.0)
-4.6% (1.0) -1.30/0 (1.3) 0.0% ( .1)
Note: Percentages are mean amount of surge or decline in the respective groupings. Fig-
ures in parentheses are standard errors.
CI California, Oregon, and Washington.
TABLE 4C
RATE OF SURGE AND DECLINE IN PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL
VOTING PER HOUR THAT THE POLLS REMAINED OPEN
Overall Turnout:
Democratic Vote:
Republican Vote:
"Other" Vote:
N=
PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
- .63 % (.3)
-2.00% (.3)
- .10% (.2)
+ 1.400/0 (.2)
435
CONGRESSIONAL VOTE
- .870/0 (.3)
-1.200/0 (.6)
.520/0 (.8)
+ .27% (.7)
422
Note: Percentages are unstandardized regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are
standard errors.
